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Abstract—Some hard problems from lattices, like LWE (Learn-
ing with Errors), are particularly suitable for application in
Cryptography due to the possibility of using worst-case to
average-case reductions as evidence of strong security properties.
In this work, we show two LWE-based constructions of zero-
knowledge identification schemes and discuss their performance
and security. We also highlight the design choices that make our
solution of both theoretical and practical interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Identification Schemes
A zero-knowledge protocol can be employed as a way
of demonstrating the knowledge of a secret without actually
revealing it. Several instantiations of this idea have been
proposed since the seminal work of Fiat and Shamir [4]. The
code-based constructions of Stern [10] and Ve´ron [11] have
recently been adapted to the lattice domain, as seen in the work
of Kawachi, Tanaka and Xagawa [5], and Cayrel, Lindner,
Ru¨ckert and Silva [2]. In the present work, we propose al-
ternative lattice-based zero-knowledge constructions, using as
security assumption the hardness of the LWE Problem, defined
below. As seen with several other lattice hard problems,
LWE exhibits worst-case to average-case reduction, which is
a very interesting property for cryptographic systems because
it increases one’s confidence that a random instance of the
system is indeed hard to break.
B. The LWE Problem
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem was first pro-
posed by Regev in [8] as an extension of the so-called Learn-
ing from Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. The search version
of LWE can be regarded, roughly speaking, as the problem of
recovering a secret s given a “noisy linear equation” of the
form As ≈ y mod q. More formally, we can state LWE as
follows [8]:
Definition I.1 (Learning with Errors) Let q be a prime
number and χ a probability distribution on Zq . Given a secret
s ∈ Znq , we denote by As,χ the probability distribution on
Z
n
q × Zq obtained by choosing a vector a ∈ Znq uniformly
at random, choosing e ∈ Zq according to χ, and outputting
(a, 〈a, s〉 + e mod q). We define (the search version of)
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LWEq,χ as the problem of recovering the secret s (with
high probability) given an arbitrary number of samples from
As,χ. The decision version of LWEq,χ is the problem of
distinguishing As,χ samples from the uniform distribution on
Z
n
q × Zq . For q = 2 this is the well-known LPN problem.
In recent years, the LWE problem has often been used as
the basis of many cryptographic constructions due to its strong
security properties such as the decision-to-search and average-
to-worst-case reductions. Moreover, if χ is the “discrete Gaus-
sian” distribution with standard deviation αq > 2/
√
n, the
hardness of LWE is proven to be related to the worst case of
some well known lattice problems such as GAPSVP and SVIP,
which are believed to be secure even under quantum attacks.
For practical applications, it is worth considering the “ideal”
version of LWE, or ring-LWE, in which the entries of a are
the coefficients of polynomials in the ring Zq/ 〈xn + 1〉, the
“anticyclic” ring. This approach allows faster matrix-vector
multiplications due to Fast Fourier Transforms and reduced
keys of size equal to O(n) elements of Zq . Also, a reduction
from the approximate version of SVP on ideal lattices to the
search version of ring-LWE under certain assumptions on χ
(what leads to a non-spherically distributed error) was recently
published [7].
It is worth noting that LWE is closely related to the SIS
problem, which is that of finding a small integer solution
x for the equation Ax = 0 mod q (or Ax = y mod q for
the inhomogeneous SIS). Concerning identification schemes,
some of them are built upon SIS and its version on ideal
lattices [2]. An ID-scheme based on a slight modification
of LWE is proposed in [12] but it is not clear whether
this modification preserves LWE hardness. Thus, the schemes
proposed in this work are, to our knowledge, the first ones
with security based on the hardness of LWE.
C. Auxiliary Primitives
Definition I.2 (Hamming isometry Πγ,Σ) Let Σ be a per-
mutation of {1, . . . , n} and γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Fnq such that
γi 6= 0, ∀i. We define the transformation Πγ,Σ as the mapping
F
n
q → Fnq , taking v to γΣ(1)vΣ(1), . . . , γΣ(n)vΣ(n).
This transformation scales through the multiplication by
a scalar and preserves the Hamming weight. That is,
∀α ∈ Fq and ∀v ∈ Fnq , we have Πγ,Σ(αv) =
αΠγ,Σ(v) and wt(Πγ,Σ(v)) = wt(v).
D. Notation and Conventions
• Vh, Ph - honest Verifier, honest Prover
• Vc, Pc - cheating Verifier, cheating Prover
• V ′, P ′ - arbitrary Verifier, arbitrary Prover
• wt - Hamming weight
• ‖ - string concatenation
• com - string commitment function
• reductions - the operations in our protocols involve mod-
ular reduction by q.
•
$←− S - choose uniformly at random from set S
•
χ←− S - choose at random from set S with distribution
χ according
• Sn - set of permutations over {1, . . . , n}
• ⊲ - comment in pseudo code
•
?
= - check if an equality holds
II. OUR LWE-BASED SCHEME
A. Version with 2/3 soundness error
1) Key-Generation Algorithm:
1: procedure KEYGEN(n,m, q)
2: A
$←− Fn×mq , s $←− Fmq , e
χ←− Fnq .
3: b← As+ e
4: p← wt(e)
5: ⊲ (A,b, p) is the public key
6: ⊲ (s, e) is the private key
7: return {(A,b, p), (s, e)}
2) Identification Algorithm:
1: procedure IDENTIFICATION(n,m, q)
2: {(A,b, p), (s, e)} ← KEYGEN(n,m, q)
3: ⊲ Prover
4: u
$←− Fmq , γ $←− Fmq with γi 6= 0, ∀i
5: Σ
$←− Sn
6: ⊲ Compute the commitments
7: c1 ← com(Πγ,Σ; r1)
8: c2 ← com(Πγ,Σ(A(u + s)); r2)
9: c3 ← com(Πγ,Σ(Au+ b); r3)
10: ⊲ Send the commitments to the Verifier
11: ⊲ Verifier
12: ch
$←− {1, 2, 3}.
13: ⊲ Send the challenge ch to the Prover.
14: ⊲ Prover
15: ⊲ Open the commitments to the Verifier
16: if ch = 1 then
17: send r1, r2,u+ s and Πγ,Σ
18: else if ch = 2 then
19: send r2, r3,Πγ,Σ(A(u + s)) and Πγ,Σ(e)
20: else if ch = 3 then
21: send r1, r3,Πγ,Σ and u
22: ⊲ Verifier
23: ⊲ Check the commitments
24: if ch = 1 then
25: check that c1 and c2 are correct.
26: else if ch = 2 then
27: check that c2 and c3 are correct;
28: check that wt(Πγ,Σ(e)) = p.
29: else if ch = 3 then
30: check that c1 and c3 are correct.
31: if all the checks were correct then
32: return “success”
33: else
34: return “failure”.
B. Properties
In this section we prove the properties of completeness,
soundness and zero-knowledge of our identification scheme.
a) Completeness:
Proof : Knowing the secret values (s, e), an honest Prover
Ph has all the information needed in order to compute the
commitments and answer the challenges that enable the honest
Verifier Vh to ascertain the validity of the commitments and
the parameters from which they were obtained. Both parties
have access to the public parameters: {A,b, com}. Thus,
Pr(Identification Algorithm(Ph, Vh) = “success”) = 1

b) Soundness:
Now we show that a cheating Prover Pc cannot deceive an
honest Verifier Vh with probability strictly greater than 2/3
without breaking the security assumptions upon which the
Identification Algorithm is built.
Theorem II.1 If Vh accepts a proof from Pc with probability
≥ (23 )r + ǫ, with ǫ non-negligible, then there exists a polyno-
mial time probabilistic machine M which, with overwhelming
probability, either computes a valid secret pair (s, e) or finds
a collision in the commitment scheme.
Let us suppose, by absurd, that the cheating Prover Pc is
able to get accepted with probability ≥ (23 )r + ǫ, with ǫ non-
negligible. Similarly to the proof technique applied by Ve´ron
[11], we show that, either a collision has been found in the
underlying commitment scheme or we can find in polynomial
time a set of commitments to which the cheating Prover
Pc is able to provide answers that enable the Verifier Vh
to re-compute them, retrieving the private secret (s, e), thus
violating the hardness of the LWE problem.
Let us use subscripts {a, b, c} to denote the answers given
to challenges {1, 2, 3}.
If one is able to find collisions in the commitment scheme,
then it is possible to come up with different answers that
reproduce the same set {c1, c2, c3}.
In the other case, prover Pc is supposed to provide answers
so that the equalities below are satisfied:
Πγa,Σa = Πγc,Σc , for c1;
Πγb,Σb(A(ub + sb)) = Πγa,Σa(A(ua + sa)) for c2;
Πγb,Σb(A(ub+sb))+Πγb,Σb(eb) = Πγc,Σc(Auc+b) for c3.
From these, one can derive the secret parameters as follows:
s ← (ua + sa)− uc;
e← Π−1γc,Σc(Πγb,Σb(eb)).
Let now RA denote the random tape from which Prover Pc
obtains the elements necessary to compute the commitments
and answers, and let Q be the set {0, 1, 2} from which the
Verifier Vh obtains his/her challenges. Denote by (f, g) ∈
(RA×Q) a pair chosen uniformly at random from these sets.
We consider such a pair to be valid, that is (f, g) ∈ Valid,
when it leads to a result equal to “success” after r rounds of
execution. We have assumed in the beginning of this proof
that the cardinalities of the sets involved are such that
card(Valid)
card(RA×Q)r ≥
(
2
3
)r
+ ǫ.
One can reason with the pigeonhole principle to characterize
the ability of the prover Pc to answer to strictly more than two
challenges for any set of commitments. It can be modeled as
follows. Let Ωr ∈ RAr such that
• When f ∈ Ωr, we have 2r + 1 ≤ card(g) ≤ 3r, with
(f, g) ∈ Valid
• When f ∈ RAr\Ωr, we have 0 ≤ card(g) ≤ 2r, with
(f, g) ∈ Valid
Hence,
card(Valid)
card((RA×Q)r) ≤
card(Ωr)
card(RAr) +
(
2
3
)r
.
From the assumption in this proof,
card(Ωr)
card(RAr) ≥ ǫ.
By resetting the cheating Prover Pc an average number of
times equal to 1/ǫ, it is possible to find an execution instances
such that he has to answer to three different challenges for the
same set of commitments. With that, we would have obtained
in polynomial time a solution for any LWE instance. 
c) Zero-Knowledge:
Let us build a simulator S that mimics the communication
tape between the Prover P and the Verifier V , and then show
that it cannot be statistically distinguished from a real tape.
Let us call (P, V ) the real communication tape, and (P ′, V ′)
its simulation. We assume that there is access to the verifier V
as a black box: it is fed with the public parameters and gives
as response a challenge.
1: procedure SIMULATOR(A, b, p, n,m, q, r)
2: ch′
$←− {1, 2, 3} ⊲ predict the challenge.
3: γ
$←− Fmq with γi 6= 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
4: Σ
$←− Sm, u′ $←− Fmq , e′
χ←− Fnq , with wt(e′) = p
5: r1
$←− {0, 1}n, r2 $←− {0, 1}n, r3 $←− {0, 1}n
6: if ch′ = 1 then ⊲ prepare {c1, c2}
7: Solve y satisfying Ay = b− e′
8: Compute c1 ← com(Πγ,Σ; r1)
9: Compute c2 ← com(Πγ,Σ(Ay; r2))
10: c3
$←− Image of com
11: else if ch′ = 2 then ⊲ prepare {c2, c3}
12: Solve s′ satisfying As′ = b− e′
13: c2 ← com(Πγ,Σ(A(u′ + s′)); r2)
14: c3 ← com(Πγ,Σ(Au′ + b); r3)
15: c1
$←− Image of com
16: else ⊲ prepare {c1, c3}
17: c1 ← com(Πγ,Σ; r1)
18: c3 ← com(Πγ,Σ(Au′ + b); r3)
19: c2
$←− Image of com
20: ch← V ′(c1, c2, c3).
21: if ch and ch′ are different then
22: rewind V ′ and goto step 2
23: else
24: Open the commitments and save the messages.
25: r ← r − 1
26: if r > 0 then
27: Go to step 2.
The values chosen by the simulator in order to compute
the commitments follow the same distribution as that from
a real execution. The statistically hiding property of the
commitment scheme com conceals the fact that some of the
commitments were just taken as random values, instead of
actually computed via the application of com to some set of
parameters. Therefore, the transcript of the simulation above
is statistically indistinguishable from what would have been
obtained from a real execution of the protocol, proving that it
has the property of statistical zero-knowledge. 
C. Version with 1/2 soundness error
Cayrel, Ve´ron and El Yousfi [3] proposed an identification
scheme with soundness error approximately 1/2, using the
hardness of syndrome decoding over q-ary code as security
assumption.
Here, we revisit their construction, adapting the core proto-
col to work over LWE. We also suggest the use of a lattice-
based string commitment scheme [1], aiming at applying
a single security assumption: the hardness of LWE. These
changes allowed us to obtain aa scheme whose security is
based on a problem for which there is a quantum reduction
from worst-cases of hard lattice problems [9]. In order to speed
up the operations involving multiplications with matrices and
vectors, as well as reducing memory footprint, we adopt the
use of rings. [7]
1) Key Generation Algorithm:
1: procedure KEYGEN(n,m, q)
2: A
$←− Fn×mq , s $←− Fmq , e
χ←− Fnq
3: b ← As+ e
4: Compute A⊥ such that AA⊥ = 0
5: y ← A⊥e; p← wt(e)
6: ⊲ (A,A⊥,y,b, p) is the public key
7: ⊲ (s, e) is the private key
8: return {(A,A⊥,y,b, p), (s, e)}
Unless stated otherwise, the random choices assume that the
distribution is uniform. In order to hide the private parameters
involved in the messages exchanged between the Prover and
the Verifier, we use three mechanisms:
i a computationally binding and statistically hiding com-
mitment scheme, denoted by com;
ii a weight-preserving transformation Πγ,Σ, as defined in
I.2;
iii a blinding sum with a random factor uniformly chosen.
2) Identification Algorithm:
1: procedure IDENTIFICATION(n,m, q)
2: {(A,A⊥,y,b, p), (s, e)} ← KEYGEN(n,m, q)
3: ⊲ Prover
4: u
$←− Fnq
5: γ
$←− Fnq with γi 6= 0, ∀i
6: Σ
$←− Sn
7: ⊲ Compute the commitments
8: c1 ← com(γ ‖ Σ ‖ A⊥u; r1)
9: c2 ← com(Πγ,Σ(u) ‖ Πγ,Σ(e); r2)
10: ⊲ Send the commitments to the Verifier
11: ⊲ Verifier
12: α
$←− Zq .
13: Send α to the Prover.
14: ⊲ Prover
15: Respond with β ← Πγ,Σ(u+ αe)
16: ⊲ Verifier
17: Send a challenge ch ∈ {1, 2}
18: ⊲ Prover
19: ⊲ Open the corresponding commitment
20: if ch = 1 then
21: respond with r1, γ,Σ
22: else if ch = 2 then
23: respond with r2,Πγ,Σ(e)
24: ⊲ Verifier
25: ⊲ Check the commitments
26: if ch = 1 then
27: c1
?
= com(Σ ‖ γ ‖ A⊥Π−1γ,Σ(β) − αy; r1)
28: else if ch = 2 then
29: c2
?
= com(β − αΠγ,Σ(e) ‖ Πγ,Σ(e); r2)
30: wt(Πγ,Σ(e))
?
= p
31: if all the checks were correct then
32: return “success”
33: else
34: return “failure”.
D. Properties
In this section we prove the properties of completeness,
soundness and zero-knowledge of our identification scheme.
a) Completeness:
Proof : The knowledge of the secret values (s, e) enables an
honest Prover Ph to compute the commitments and answer any
challenge that the honest Verifier Vh may pose. Both parties
have access to the public parameters {A⊥,y, com}. Thus,
Pr(Identification Algorithm(Ph, Vh) = “success”) = 1

b) Soundness:
The structure of the protocol is essentially that from Cayrel et
al. [3], except for the way the commitments are computed and
the underlying hard problem. The reasoning about the relative
size of the sample spaces from which the random choices are
made follow a similar line. The main difference rests in the
way the secret keys are extracted from the commitments once
they are opened by the Prover, as shown below.
Theorem II.2 If Vh accepts a proof from Pc with probability
≥ ( q+12q )r+ǫ, with ǫ non-negligible, then there exists a polyno-
mial time probabilistic machine M which, with overwhelming
probability, either computes the secret value e or finds a
collision in the commitment scheme.
We use subscript a to denote the values revealed upon
reception of challenge equal to 1, and subscript b for challenge
equal to 2. Then
Πγa,Σa = Πγb,Σb , for c1,
Πγa,Σa(ea) = Πγb,Σb(eb) for c2.
Given that {γa,Σa} are published due to the challenge equal
to 1, and Πγb,Σb(eb) is published due to the challenge equal to
2, such information can be used to derive the secret parameter
e as follows:
e← Π−1γa,Σa(Πγb,Σb(eb)).
From the assumption made in this proof,
card(Ωr)
card(RAr) ≥ ǫ.
By resetting the cheating Prover Pc an average number of
times equal to 1/ǫ, it is possible to find an execution instances
such that he has to answer to three different challenges for the
same set of commitments. With that, we would have obtained
in polynomial time a solution for any LWE instance. 
c) Zero-Knowledge:
Let us build a simulator S that mimics the communication
between the Prover P and the Verifier V , and then show that
it cannot be statistically distinguished from a real tape. Let
us call (P, V ) the real communication tape, and (P ′, V ′) its
simulation. We assume that there is access to the verifier V
as a black box: it is fed with the public parameters and gives
as response a challenge.
The simulator is built as follows, using oracle access to a
verifier V .
1: procedure SIMULATOR(A,A⊥, b, y, p, n,m, q, r)
2: γ
$←− Fmq with γi 6= 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
3: Σ
$←− Sm, ch′ $←− {1, 2}, u′ $←− Fmq
4: r1
$←− {0, 1}n, r2 $←− {0, 1}n
5: if ch′ = 1 then
6: Solve e′ for A⊥e′ = b
7: c1 ← com(γ ‖ Σ ‖ A⊥u′; r1)
8: c2
$←− Image of com
9: else
10: e′
$←− Fmq with wt(e′) = p
11: c2 ← com(Πγ,Σ(u′) ‖ Πγ,Σ(e′); r2)
12: c1
$←− Image of com
13: α← V ′(c1, c2)
14: β ← Πγ,Σ(u′ + αe′)
15: ch′ ← V ′(c1, c2, β)
16: if ch and ch′ are different then
17: rewind V ′ and go to step 2
18: else
19: Open the commitments and save the messages.
20: r ← r − 1
21: if r > 0 then
22: Go to step 2.
The values chosen by the simulator in order to compute the
commitments follow the same distribution as that from a real
execution. The statistically hiding property of the commitment
scheme com conceals the fact that some of the commitments
were just taken as random values. Therefore, the transcript
of the simulation above is statistically indistinguishable from
what would have been obtained from a real execution of the
protocol, proving that it has the property of statistical zero-
knowledge. 
E. Security and Performance
1) Overall Soundness Error: There are two security aspects
to be taken into account regarding the scheme: the hardness
of the underlying LWE problem and the overall soundness
error. The first factor is linked with the values of {n,m, q}
and can be determined using the best known algorithm for
solving LWE [6]. The analysis of Lindner and Peikert address
an encryption scheme but we believe they can be adapted to
our setting. The second is related to the desired upper bound
L for the probability of success for an impersonation after
r rounds of protocol execution. It has a direct impact in the
communication costs, given that the following condition must
be met:
• (2/3)r ≤ L for the first scheme;
•
(
q+1
2q
)r
≤ L for the second scheme.
Our system is secure under the Serial Active Model.
2) Communication Costs: Let us calculate the average com-
munication costs for this identification scheme. Whenever a
random vector is supposed to be exchanged between the Prover
and the Verifier, we send the corresponding seed from which
the element can be obtained, assuming that both parties agree
upon the use of a pseudo-random generator. The definition of
the isometry Πγ,Σ takes two seeds (one for the vector γ and
other for the permutation Σ). The number of bits of a given
element is returned by the application of |seed|. Therefore,
the payload breakdown per round of execution can be seen as
follows:
• Commitments: 3 |com|
• Challenge: ⌈log2 max(ch)⌉
• Answer (avergage): 103 |seed|+ 23 (m+ n) ⌈log2 q⌉
Similarly to the procedure followed with the 2/3 soundness
error scheme, we have for the 1/2 soundness error version the
following breakdown for the communication costs per round:
• Commitments: 2 |com|+ n ⌈log2 q⌉
• Challenges: ⌈log2 max(ch)⌉+ ⌈log2 q⌉
• Answer (average): 2 |seed|+ n2 ⌈log2 q⌉
III. CONCLUSION
We have shown in this paper an adaptation for lattices
of two zero-knowledge identification schemes originally de-
signed with codes. Using the hardness of LWE as security
assumption and a set of suitable parameters, we obtained
a construction with worst-case connection with hard lattice
problems. Through the use of ring-LWE constructions, the
memory footprint is taken to levels similar to what could
be obtained with ideal-SIS schemes and operations involving
multiplication with vectors are more efficiently performed via
FFT. Besides, the adaptations preserved much of the structure
of the original protocols. From a theoretical angle, this points
towards a possible unification of cryptographic schemes based
on codes and lattices.
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